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**THE SOCIO-
POLITICAL ESSENCE
OF MAOISM**

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Introduction

Different social theories and concepts clash with one another in the complex and acute ideological-political struggle that is taking place in the world today. The growth of the role of the masses, of their impact on political developments gives rise to sharp antagonism between ideologies on both a national and an international scale, with each of them seeking to win over the broadest sections of the population. Struggle is being waged over such pressing issues as ways of re-fashioning society and the state in accordance with reason and the principle of justice, and the creation of harmonious forms of life for mankind.

The role of universal theory of revolutionary renovation of the world is claimed today by Maoism.

Aggressive and persistent self-advertisement has made Maoism a conspicuous phenomenon in the ideological and political life of the world today. Millions of copies of cheap editions of books containing Mao Tse-tung's utterances are distributed in countries of Asia, Europe and America. The printing of the "Book of Quotations" alone has exceeded 3,000 million copies.

While rejecting the capitalist mode of production and the socio-political organization of bourgeois society, Maoism attacks with the same, or

perhaps even greater fury, the practice of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and the socialist countries friendly to it, the theoretical foundations of scientific socialism and the revolutionary activity of those parties which refuse to accept Maoism as a platform for their work.

In the late 1950's the Chinese leadership set out to bring under its ideological influence and political control the world Communist movement and the contingents of the national-liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America that are close to it. Having failed in their attempt to impose their line upon the Communist parties, the Maoist leadership launched a policy of splitting the revolutionary forces. With considerable effort the Maoists managed to detach some politically active groups in a number of countries from the Communist movement. Relying on these groups, the Chinese splitters are seeking to create the impression that there exists a "truly revolutionary" movement guided by the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung". An inevitable result of this is that Maoism, which does not break with Marxism-Leninism formally, has begun to acquire features of its antithesis, and this has won it the attention and sympathies of many bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologists. The latter readily support the Maoists's claim to leadership in the creative development of Marxism and, while themselves being convinced opponents of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, are conducting a far-flung campaign in defence of Maoism as an allegedly new, creative current in contemporary Marxism. What they are trying to do is not only to counterpose Maoism to Marxism, but to place Maoism above Marxism.

The Maoists and their bourgeois defenders

present Maoism as a balanced, coherent system of views which adequately reflects the experience of the victorious Chinese revolution (with taking into account the peculiarities of pre-revolutionary Chinese society) and as a comprehensive teaching on the ways of overcoming social, economic and cultural backwardness in an undeveloped country where small peasants make up the bulk of the population.

Maoism stands in particularly high favour with bourgeois scholars mainly because in recent years Maoist propaganda has advanced to the forefront of the anti-Soviet campaign. There has not been a single action by the Soviet Union which has not been viciously attacked by the Maoists. In this respect the imperialists sometimes have to yield the palm to the Peking bawlers. In token of gratitude for this militant anti-Sovietism the enemies of socialism depict Mao as a thinker with a special insight, as a daring ideologist who has worked out an independent philosophic system to comprehend and refashion the world.

A close, objective look at Mao Tse-tung's works shows, however, that they do not contain any comprehensive and consistent philosophic system. They are speeches and notes made by Mao in different times on this or that concrete occasion for the purpose of justifying and explaining his plans and actions. Mao Tse-tung is first of all a politician who has had (and still has) to deal with highly complicated situations and who must prove the correctness and necessity of the tactical methods and schemes proposed by him or, in the event of their failure, to justify them in order to maintain his authority as the wise helmsman. Understandably, like many other politicians, Mao Tse-tung has had to prove the cor-

rectness of his ideas and proposals, while criticizing the views and opinions of his opponents, and in this he has demonstrated a no ordinary skill, using in his interests the theoreticians who were at his disposal.

The peculiarities of political struggle in China and within the Chinese Communist Party—both before and after the victory of the people's revolution—have left their imprint on Mao Tse-tung as a political fighter who has had to resort to the most diverse methods to uphold his right to wield absolute power in the country and to pronounce the final judgement on all practical questions of Party policy. It is not surprising, therefore, that even in official editions of Mao Tse-tung's works one finds contradictory statements and vague formulations which can be interpreted in different ways and lead to diametrically opposite conclusions. Maoism is, essentially, a system of slogans which change from time to time depending on the concrete circumstances, and political directives designed to mobilize the masses. This enables the Maoists constantly to manoeuvre and to change sharply political orientations while keeping the masses convinced of the infallibility of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas". In the struggle to retain ideological and political control over the Party and state apparatus and to eliminate the forces opposed to him Mao Tse-tung shuns no means, as in his view the end justifies the means.

This has already seriously damaged the cause of socialism in China; it has also done great harm to the world revolutionary movement since the Maoists adhere to the same mode of action outside China, distorting the ideals of socialism and discrediting the ideas of revolutionary trans-

formation of the world. They proceed with their policy of splitting the socialist community; they work to subvert co-operation between socialist and developing countries and interfere with the uniting of the efforts of these countries in the struggle for peace and against the forces of reaction and militarism. The Maoists confuse those social groups in the capitalist countries which are discontented with the existing order of things but do not accept communist or socialist programmes. Speculating on the sentiments and prejudices of these groups and strata and especially the student youth, the adherents of Maoism try to rally them to their banners, and in some instances they succeed in this. Thus, the general onslaught on the positions of the reactionary bourgeoisie is weakened, the foundations for united action are shaken and the effectiveness of the struggle for democracy and social progress reduced.

I. The Chinese Revolution and the Maoist Interpretation of It

It is natural for the leaders of a victorious revolution to publicize their experience, to try to pass it on to the revolutionaries of other countries. But in generalizing and conceptualizing one nation's experience it is necessary to be as objective as possible, to take fully into account the concrete historical conditions, the peculiarities of the formation of the revolutionary situation in that country and the specific forms and methods of ideological, political and armed struggle it has used. National experience is useful to the international proletariat only when it is treated objectively and critically, when the objective and subjective factors that worked for or against the revolution are carefully considered and defined.

The victory of the people's revolution in China in 1949 was an event of truly worldwide significance. The growing interest in the history of this revolution, in the policy and tactics of the Chinese Communists during all its stages was therefore understandable. A substantial contribution to the study of the history of the revolutionary process in China ought to have been made by the CPC leaders themselves. But Chinese propaganda began to present the revolutionary struggle in China in a distorted form,

overemphasizing those elements which fitted into the Maoist scheme and confirmed its correctness. Moreover, the path of development of the Chinese revolution, which reflected the conditions prevailing in an undeveloped small-peasant country, politically fragmented and economically dependent on imperialist powers, was interpreted in such a way as to give it universal significance. The path of the Chinese revolution was declared to be the only acceptable one, at least in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Maoists do not take into consideration at all such a question as to what extent the national features and the economic and cultural level of a given country, her social maturity are similar to those of China. Nor are the Maoists interested in knowing the level of political awareness of the working people and of the maturity of the workers' and peasants' movement, the degree of ripeness of the revolutionary situation in the country concerned is absolutely of no interest to them.

They totally ignore Lenin's principle that one should adopt a concrete, historical approach to all social phenomena, and in the first place to the question of revolution. He wrote: "The essence of the question... is that different nations are advancing in the same historical direction, but by very different zigzags and by-paths, and that the more cultured nations are obviously proceeding in a way that differs from that of the less cultured nations." *

Without making an objective analysis of the concrete situation in different countries, Mao Tse-tung maintains that a "splendid revolutionary si-

* V. I. Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 29, p. 195.

tuation" already exists in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In his opinion, 90 per cent of the world's population want revolution. It will be noted that Maoist propaganda uses the word "revolution" too often, in and out of season, and in connection with events and phenomena which bear no relation to the concept of "revolution".

In asserting that nearly all the people of the world want revolution, Mao Tse-tung and his followers completely disregard the question of the socio-economic essence of the revolutionary process in different countries, and fail to explain what type of revolution they have in mind. It is common knowledge, however, that the question of the class and socio-economic character of the revolution is of immense importance. On a correct approach to this question depend the elaboration of a correct strategy of revolutionary struggle, an understanding of the motive forces of the revolution, the advancement of slogans capable of mobilizing the masses, and a correct choice of methods of party work.

Regardless of the concrete situation and the correlation of class forces in a particular country and international conditions, the Maoists insist on the universal application of one method, that of armed struggle. In their presentation armed struggle is something in the nature of an incantation, a wonder-working means which alone can lead to revolution. According to Mao Tse-tung, "the central task of a revolution and its highest form is seizure of power by armed force, that is, the solution of the problem through war". Hence his dictum "power grows out of the barrel of a gun".

The history of revolutionary struggle in China does testify to the vast importance of the military

factor in achieving victory over the Kuomintang * reactionaries. During the concluding stage of the people's revolution, of decisive importance was the fact that the Communist Party of China had built an army which in combat qualities and morale was superior to the Kuomintang troops. But while calling attention to the importance of the military factor one should not forget that the Chinese Communists do not owe their victory to it alone. China's leaders recognized the importance of armed struggle back in the 1920s and 1930s. For instance, in 1926 Chu Chiu-po, a CPC leader, wrote in the article "The Question of Armed Struggle of the Chinese Revolution" ** that revolutionary war was the most effective method of successfully carrying out a revolution in China. But that was written at a time when the march of the People's Revolutionary Army against the militarist cliques ruling in China was being prepared, when co-operation still existed between the Communists and the Kuomintang, and the Chinese revolution was gathering momentum. And even then many CPC leaders justly believed that a revolutionary war alone would not bring victory if not combined with mass po-

* The Kuomintang (national party) was founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1912. In 1924 it was reorganized with the assistance of the Communist International. The Communists joined it, and it assumed the role of the leader of the national-democratic movement in China. After the defeat of the revolution of 1925-27, the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), became a reactionary party expressing the interests of the bourgeoisie, the landowners and the military and civil bureaucracy. Its domination was eliminated as a result of the victory of the people's revolution in 1949. At present the Kuomintang is the ruling party on Taiwan. It is opposed to the island's reunification with the mainland.

** *Hsin Chingnien*, No. 4, 1926, pp. 20-30.

litical work to raise the level of class consciousness, organization and revolutionary activity of the workers and peasants.

After the defeat in the revolution of 1925-27 * the Chinese Communists tried to use the method of armed struggle to rekindle the flame of the revolution. But they failed in their numerous attempts to organize armed uprisings in cities and rural areas. There were the unsuccessful Nankiang Uprising in August 1927 and the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927; the Canton (Kuang-chou) Commune in December 1927 was drowned in blood. ** All these exploits of the Chinese Communists did not pass without a trace; each of them contributed to the development of the revolutionary movement in China, but none of them accomplished the tasks the CPC leaders had set for them.

In the late 1920's and early 1930's the guerilla armed struggle against the Kuomintang regime bore the first fruit. Soviet districts with democratic government were formed in the mountains of Kiangsi and in a number of other provinces. But all the efforts to set up revolutionary bases

* The aim of the revolution of 1925-27 was to free China from economic and political dependence on imperialist powers, put an end to the regime of warlord cliques, and ensure the political unity of the country. Elimination of feudal survivals in the countryside was to help ensure the success of the revolution. In that revolution the CPC acted in alliance with the Kuomintang, a bourgeois-landlord nationalist party. The revolution suffered defeat after a counter-revolutionary coup led by Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927.

** These uprisings were heroic attempts of the Chinese Communists to save the cause of the revolution and regain the positions lost after Chiang-Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary coup and the disruption of the CPC-Kuomintang united front.

throughout the country, overthrow the Kuomintang and seize power came to nothing. The correlation of political forces in the country and the international situation worked against the Chinese Communists. There were no objective conditions for success. On the scale of the whole country, the worker-peasant movement had not yet reached a level where it could become the shock force of the revolution. The workers and peasants were not ready both politically and organizationally for a decisive battle against their oppressors and exploiters. In such conditions the singing of praises of the gun, of armed struggle, did not produce the desired effect. The Chinese Red Army detachments fought valiantly, but they had to retreat, with losses, to the north-western regions of the country. The gun proved unable to save the Soviet districts from defeat.

Later on, when the political situation in China had changed and a new international situation had shaped up, the armed struggle of the Chinese Communists began to yield results and ultimately led them to victory. But this occurred in the 1940's, when the Soviet Union, fulfilling its allied commitments, had dealt a staggering blow to Japanese militarism. By that time the political capital which the Kuomintang had once possessed had been almost fully spent, and its anti-popular, anti-national policy had roused sharp discontent and indignation among the workers, peasants, the petty and middle bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the student youth. In such conditions the victory of the Chinese revolution was facilitated not only by military factors but by a number of other factors which the Maoist theoreticians choose not to mention.

Of great importance to the people's revolution

in China were the changes that had taken place in the correlation of world forces after the Second World War. The defeat of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, to which the Soviet Union had made the decisive contribution, had changed the political climate in the world, promoting an upsurge of the national-liberation movement in the countries of Asia and the Pacific, China included. The international positions of the Soviet Union had grown noticeably stronger. European Communist parties had become more influential.

In these circumstances the US imperialists, who had been giving the Kuomintang military and other aid besides political and moral support, did not venture to intervene directly. American diplomacy was compelled to assume the role of mediator and peacemaker in the conflict that had flared up between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China after the capitulation of Japan, although in that game of mediation the sympathies of the US military and diplomats were, of course, on the Kuomintang's side.

During the initial period of the civil war in China, in 1945-46, the United States' "peacemaking" tactics benefited in a way the CPC, giving it time and opportunity for consolidating and extending their military positions and preparing its armies for a decisive engagement. Thus, although objectively the Chinese revolution was carrying out tasks of an anti-imperialist character, it was not confronted with the necessity of engaging in a direct armed clash with the imperialist powers.

The Maoists also prefer not to mention another factor, which in fact played a role of paramount importance during the initial stage of the civil war, namely, the liberation by Soviet troops of

Manchuria, the country's most highly developed region both militarily and industrially. In Manchuria the CPC had extensive possibilities for political activity, for the accumulation and regrouping of forces, for preparing the bridgehead for a general offensive against Chiang Kai-shek's armies. The command of the Soviet troops turned over to the Communist-led armies vast quantities of captured weapons and equipment. Thanks to this the People's Liberation Army was able not only to repel the attacks of the Kuomintang troops but to strike a mortal blow at them in Manchuria, thereby changing the course of the war in its favour.

In 1949 Mao Tse-tung wrote: "If the Soviet Union did not exist, if no victory over fascism in the Second World War had been won, if Japanese imperialism had not been defeated, if the countries of people's democracy had not come into being, if the oppressed nations of the East had not now risen in struggle, if the masses of people in the United States of America, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and other capitalist countries did not wage a struggle against the reactionary forces dominating over them—had it not been for all this, the forces of international reaction bearing down upon us would certainly have been immeasurably greater than they are today. Could we have won victory under such circumstances? Obviously not." *

As for the internal political conditions in which the Chinese revolution proceeded during its final stage, in 1946-49, here too, in addition to the military factor, an important part was played by

* Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (in Russian), Peking, Vol. 4, p. 508.

political factors. In the very first months after Japan's capitulation, the corruption in the Kuomintang government was more clearly revealed than ever before. It proved incapable of uniting all the sections of the population on a democratic basis and ensuring peace and order in the country. With its policy which ignored the needs of the people it antagonized broad sections of the Chinese public. The utter corruption of the officialdom, disregard for the country's laws, the arbitrary rule of the military and of the Kuomintang's secret police—all this eroded the social foundations of the Kuomintang's rule.

The army and the administrative apparatus were headed by venal and incompetent generals and officials who were constantly fighting among themselves. To retain power the Chiang Kai-shek clique concluded treaties and agreements with the United States which injured the national sovereignty of the country and the economic interests of the Chinese bourgeoisie.

The weakness and instability of the Kuomintang regime were so obvious that Chiang Kai-shek's American friends talked about them openly.

The Communist Party alone during that period proved a consistent fighter for peace and democracy in the country, a defender of national interests. The CPC leadership showed then its readiness to come to a peaceful settlement with Chiang Kai-shek. Mao Tse-tung held talks with Chiang Kai-shek aimed at preventing a civil war. The Communists did not appear to the Chinese people then as advocates of crude, forcible methods of settling a conflict that had come to a head; they did not rattle sabres but held out an olive branch. This tactics won them the regard of pro-

minent and respected public figures who were far from being sympathetic towards socialism.

Furthermore, the Chinese Communists made it clear then that it was not their intention immediately to introduce socialist principles in administering the country's economy. The political platform of the CPC incorporated Sun Yat-sen's principle of regulating and restricting capitalism and not abolishing it. While concentrating fire upon the big, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the CPC declared that it would safeguard the rights and interests of the national bourgeoisie if they did not do harm to the interests of society as a whole, that it would encourage the activity of private industrial and trading enterprises, and facilitate capital investments by landlords and kulaks (rich peasants) in industrial and commercial enterprises that would come under the protection of the new democratic state.

The Communist Party called for the enactment of democratic laws, fought for freedom of speech and was opposed to coercive methods.

At a time when the Kuomintang authorities ruthlessly persecuted and hounded democratic parties and groups, the CPC proclaimed a line for long-term co-operation with democratic leaders and promised them seats in the future government. The slogans of peace and democracy helped the Party to build up its popularity and to secure not merely the neutrality but also active political support of a considerable part of the petty and middle bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the students. As a result of the pursuit of a policy based on the theory of new democracy the Communist Party strengthened its positions, coming forward as a spokesman not only of the workers and peasants but of the whole nation,

while the Kuomintang was being increasingly isolated.

In short, in its struggle against the Kuomintang the CPC used not only the force of arms but that of persuasion. Its leaders realized then that the gun did not by itself bring power, that political struggle to win over the masses was as important as fighting the enemy in the battlefield.

In rejecting peaceful, political forms of struggle today the Maoists refer to their own experience; by doing so they falsify the history of their advent to power. They also keep silent about the fact that those attempts to seize power through armed struggle that were undertaken in a number of Asian countries in the absence of the necessary objective conditions had not only failed but had resulted in the retreat of the revolutionaries in these countries. Such attempts led to their isolation and deprived them of the possibility of conducting work among the masses of working people and of influencing their countries' socio-political development. This is confirmed by the sad experience of armed struggle in Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines and Burma.

Subjectivism in the interpretation by the Maoists of their experience is also seen in their assessment of the role of the peasantry as the main motive force in any national revolution. They contend that the working class, in Europe and America first of all, has long lost its revolutionary spirit, and that those who strive to accomplish a world revolution should turn their attention to the village. Expounding "Mao Tse-tung's ideas", Lin Piao wrote: "Speaking of the globe as a whole, North America and Western Europe can be called 'the world city' while Asia, Africa and Latin America are the 'world village'. Since the

Second World War the revolutionary proletarian movement in the capitalist countries of North America and Western Europe has been on the wane, while the revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has unfolded with unprecedented force. In this sense the modern revolution presents a picture of the encirclement of the cities by the village." *

No one will deny that the Chinese peasantry was an important motive force of the revolution. It could not have been otherwise in an agrarian country where eight-tenths of the population were engaged in agriculture. The exceptional importance of the agrarian-peasant question in China was repeatedly emphasized by the Comintern. In 1923, in a letter to the Chinese Communists, the Comintern Executive pointed to the importance of work among the peasants. It said: "The national revolution in China and the building up of an anti-imperialist front will be necessarily accompanied by an agrarian revolution of the peasantry against the vestiges of feudalism. This revolution can be victorious only if the bulk of the Chinese population—the poor peasants—is drawn into the movement." ** But the Comintern had always held that the peasants' struggle should proceed in alliance with and under the leadership of the working class.

Insisting on the decisive role of the peasantry, the Maoists are seeking to separate it from its natural ally and leader, the working class, and thereby to reduce its possibilities in the struggle

* *Hungchi*, No. 10, 1965.

** *The Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National-Colonial Revolution as Shown in the Case of China* (in Russian), Moscow, 1934, p. 114.

for liberation from misery and exploitation, for a radical transformation of its life.

In talks with visitors from abroad the Maoists never tire of repeating that the village is the base of the world revolution, and they cite the experience of China where the revolution started in the countryside and moved on to the cities.

It is true that for many years the Chinese Communists operated in rural localities where they had their revolutionary bases. It is common knowledge, however, that in the beginning they worked mainly in cities, with only some representatives of the CPC working in the countryside, although the importance of work in rural areas was emphasized in decisions of Party congresses. The retreat of the Chinese Communists from the cities to remote mountainous rural districts was not a planned and theoretically substantiated move but a forced one, made necessary by Kuomintang repressions in the cities.

For a long period of time the Chinese Communists had had no stable links with the urban proletariat, and they established and strengthened their positions in rural localities. This enabled them to preserve the forces of the Party but at the same time it changed the character and forms of its activity and furthered the spread of non-proletarian views among its members. The experience of the peasant movement in the Soviet districts of China testifies not so much to the spontaneous revolutionary activity of the peasants as to their passivity, political apathy and inability to wage an independent political struggle. During that period the main force of the Chinese revolution was the military and Party workers, which prevented reaction from putting out

the sparks of revolutionary struggle. But even that heroic struggle in economically undeveloped regions could continue only owing to certain conditions.

After the formation of the Kuomintang government and up to the time of the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war there were incessant fightings between different Kuomintang groupings. The state remained politically fragmented. The Kuomintang could not establish a stable and strong central government. And this no doubt facilitated the activity of Communists in the depths of the countryside, but they could not wage their struggle on a nationwide scale. Their activity was limited by objective conditions.

Yet, even when more favourable conditions had appeared, the fact that they confined their activity to the countryside prevented the Communists from achieving victory on a nationwide scale. It was possible to carry on a struggle in the rural localities, but it was impossible to win victory by relying only on the village. The experience of the concluding period of the civil war shows this. At the beginning of the war the CPC was politically strong and influential after having won allies and supporters among the urban population. But later, when it came to carrying out a revolution of a socialist type, the untenability of the Maoist theories on the decisive role of the peasantry became even more obvious.

Maoist views are diametrically opposed to Marxist-Leninist theses concerning the working class as the leading force of social progress, and the alliance of the working class and the peasantry.

Mao Tse-tung's utterances reveal a hostile attitude towards the working class, the proletarian

world outlook, and scientific socialism. In what Mao Tse-tung says about the proletariat of the developed capitalist countries one detects a feeling of contempt for the proletarian methods of struggle, for proletarian organization and discipline.

The theory of the decisive role of the "world village" is designed to serve a specific foreign-policy aim: to win for the Maoists a leading position in the Third World countries. It calls for undermining these countries' ties with the socialist states and the Soviet Union above all. For the Maoists see the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Europe as belonging to the "world city" and therefore also subject to encirclement by the "world village".

As we see, the one-sided interpretation of the rich experience of the Chinese revolution, the deliberate exaggeration of some of its peculiarities and the hushing up of others, is dictated by the political aim of justifying and making more attractive and grounded Peking's present course of winning hegemony in the Third World and weakening the positions of world socialism.

II. Can Socialism Be Built According to Mao's Formulas?

What are the ideals which Mao Tse-tung would like to carry out in China and the world over if it were within his powers?

Mao's demagogic asseverations to the effect that the interests of the world revolution are uppermost in his mind pursue the double aim of justifying his claims to the role of the leader of the world's working people, and assuring the Chinese people that the privations and trials they are suffering as a result of the implementation of Mao Tse-tung's line at home and abroad are dictated by the interests of the world revolution.

The Maoists declare that their ultimate goal is socialism, which will turn China into a powerful and prosperous state and create a society of "great harmony" in the country.

To turn China into a powerful and prosperous country was the dream of many Chinese thinkers and politicians in the past. The ideas of *tatung* (great harmony or great union) and *fuchiang* (a prosperous and powerful state) were part of the theoretical system of the leaders of old China who pondered over ways of ridding their country of its backwardness, eliminating its dependence on foreign powers, and winning for it a worthy

place in the world family of nations. These ideas also feed the political thought of Mao Tse-tung, who claims that he sees a key to the solution of China's socio-political and economic problems in socialism.

As noted earlier, Mao Tse-tung categorically rejects the capitalist ways of securing a better future, and capitalism as a form of organization of society. At the same time, he does not accept the basic propositions of scientific socialism. The experience and practice of socialist construction in the Soviet Union are condemned by him as not conforming to his conception of socialist society. He also viciously attacks the methods of administering the economy adopted in the USSR and the socialist countries of Europe, their cultural and educational policies, and the system of relationships between Party and state bodies in these countries. Thus, "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" are both anti-capitalist and anti-socialist.

An important reservation must be made here regarding Mao Tse-tung's understanding of the basic categories of capitalism and socialism, which differs from a scientific, Marxist approach to the question. Here it should be borne in mind that the tasks of China's socio-economic and cultural development are determined by a politician whose life experience has been connected with backward forms of organization of production within the framework of a subsistence economy. The mental horizon of such a man is circumscribed by the conservative way of life of the peasant family with its constant poverty and illusory dreams of a better but vaguely envisioned future. To him the city was the breeding ground of luxury and depravity which only consume without giving anything in return. It is not fortuitous

that when the Chinese revolutionaries began to capture cities in the course of the civil war one of their slogans was: "Turn the cities from consumers into producers". To the peasant with his limited understanding, the city was inhabited by people living on the land tillers' labour.

Today the Maoists' utterances against the capitalist system and the bourgeois world outlook are invariably accompanied by attacks against scientific socialism, which, as is known, proclaims satisfaction of the material needs of people as one of its basic principles.

Mao Tse-tung thinks that it is impossible to build communism in any one country before the collapse of capitalism as a world system. Incidentally, there was a time when Mao held different but no less extreme view. Carried away with the idea of the "great leap" he believed that China stood on the threshold of communism which would set in as soon as the "golden bridge" was built, i.e., when the people's communes were set up. After the ignominious failure of his plans he postponed the time for the building of socialism in China and her transition to communism and began to speak of a delay of 100 to 200 years and later declared that communism could not be built—in China or in any other country—until imperialism was fully done away with.

A characteristic feature of Mao Tse-tung's discourses on socialism is the absence of an economic substantiation of the ideas propounded by him. He repeatedly attacks the thesis that the building of socialist society necessitates developing the country's productive forces through raising labour productivity and making maximum use of the achievements of science and technology. In 1958, the official interpreter of Mao's writings,

Chen Po-ta,* expressed himself in this way to prove the original character of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas".** Similar views were cultivated by Mao Tse-tung and his supporters in the period of the "cultural revolution".

The Maoists denounced Liu Shao-chi*** for his "pernicious" idea of promoting the all-round development of the country's productive forces. At the 10th Congress of the CPC (1973) and after the congress similar charges were made against Lin Piao**** and Chen Po-ta.

Does this mean that the Communist Party of China and its leadership are not interested in the country's economic growth? No, it does not mean that. Tremendous efforts are being made in China to build factories, mines, railways and oil-fields. Utilizing the achievements of world science and technology the Chinese are now making up-to-date electronic computers. But Mao Tse-tung and

* Chen Po-ta (born 1904), an active propagandist of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas", one of the leaders of the "cultural revolution". At the 9th Congress of the CPC in 1969 he was included in the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC CC. At the 10th Congress of the CPC he was denounced as a member of Lin Piao's anti-Party group.

** See *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1958.

*** Liu Shao-chi (born 1898), a prominent CPC leader, for many years a Vice-Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. In 1959-67 he was Chairman of the PRC. During the "cultural revolution" he was denounced as "the first leader who has taken the capitalist road", removed from the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and dismissed from the post of PRC Chairman.

**** Lin Piao (1907-71) was an active participant in the civil war in China. In the period between 1958 and 1970 he was a Vice-Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Together with Mao Tse-tung he led the "cultural revolution". After his death in September 1971 he was accused of having conspired against Mao.

his followers believe that growth of production as such, accompanied by improvements in the people's living standards, cannot be the principal goal of socialist society. They claim that high output by workers and peasants, the raising of labour productivity, the efficient work of specialists and use of technical innovations, the efforts to cut manpower and material expenditure and to make industrial enterprises profitable are inherent features of the capitalist system.

In the course of many years, beginning with 1958, Mao Tse-tung has expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that in China "vestiges of bourgeois law" are preserved, that "the piece-rate system of remuneration is used, distribution is conducted according to work, and exchange is carried out through the medium of money".* Even then Mao Tse-tung spoke of the need to consider the question of abandoning the system of monetary wages and restoring the system of free supply, i.e., the system that had existed in Yanan, in the liberated regions of China, during the anti-Japanese war and the civil war. He placed great hopes in the people's communes, as a result of whose formation, he contended, the country would gradually abolish the bourgeois system of salaries.

The attempt to carry out this scheme failed. But this did not discourage Mao Tse-tung. In 1969, after the 9th CPC Congress, he again raised this question, noting that during the war he and his comrades had not been paid salaries and had not thought of remuneration but had worked "for the sake of the revolution". Since February 1975, on direct orders from Mao Tse-tung, this idea has again been touted in the Chinese press. It is hard

* *Jenmin jihpao*, February 9, 1975.

to say whether this is more indicative of hypocrisy or of a callous attitude towards the working people concerned with their daily bread.

Despite a certain improvement in the country's standard of living after the revolution, life remains hard for the Chinese workers and peasants. As admitted by the official press, people continue to complain against shortages of food, clothing and other basic necessities. They resent the fact that "the state is becoming powerful but the people remain poor". *

A disregard for the material needs of the working people can be seen in many utterances by Mao Tse-tung, obsessed with his great-power ambitions and prepared, as one Chinese statesman put it, "to leave the people without pants if only he could have the atom bomb".

"China must become not only the political centre of the world, but also its military and technical centre," Mao Tse-tung once said. In his opinion, the development of the country's economy must be subordinated to the aim of restoring "national grandeur". In his talks with visitors from Asian, African and Latin American countries Mao Tse-tung has said on many occasions that the main task after winning victory in the revolution is rapid development of the war industry. China, he stated, intends to become a huge munitions plant manufacturing rifles, cannon, tanks and aircraft.

Mao Tse-tung's attacks on the socialist principles of running the economy, his callous disregard for the material conditions of the people are obviously of an extremely reactionary character. There is nothing revolutionary in them. The main task of socialist enterprises, as he sees it, is not so much to increase production as to preserve their

* *Jenmin jihpao*, April 4, 1975.

"socialist" nature and prevent the spread of the "bourgeois" way of thinking through a constant "class struggle". According to Mao Tse-tung, a class is not a socio-economic but primarily an ideological community of people. When the Maoists speak of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat they do not have in mind the relation in which they stand to the means of production. To them, the main criterion of the class affiliation of people is their way of thinking, or, more precisely, their attitude towards Mao Tse-tung's ideas. Their material position comes second.

To justify the ideological campaigns against those who refuse to recognize "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" as the absolute truth and who try to avoid carrying out the precepts of the "great helmsman", the Maoists have elaborated a false scheme of the social structure of Chinese society based on a conception of "new bourgeois elements". In July 1964 the newspaper *Jenmin jihpao* stated that, despite the victory of public ownership of the means of production in town and country, despite the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture in China, there were constantly appearing "new bourgeois elements", "embezzlers" and "plunderers of public property". In the opinion of the Maoist theoreticians, the establishment of co-operatives in agriculture and afterwards its "communization" have not stopped the process of polarization among the peasantry and that "there remains soil for the rise of kulaks". *

It is clear from material published in the Chinese press that in a country where the slightest possibility for the use and exploitation of wage labour has been practically eliminated in the countryside, by "new kulaks" are meant those peasants who, earning more in the collective than the average peasants do, and ably utilizing his household plot of land and engaging auxiliary trades, strive to improve the material position of their families. Through their own labour they attain a higher standard of living than their neighbours. It is natural that these strata of the rural population refuse to recognize the wisdom and correctness of Mao Tse-tung's voluntar-

* *Jenmin jihpao*, July 14, 1964.

ist slogans and try to resist the experiments that he foists upon them.

In the cities the Maoists find "new bourgeois elements" among the intelligentsia, civil servants and Party functionaries. Here, the Maoists have in mind, not the people exploiting wage labour, but the specialists who get higher salaries than others. They are "particularly harmful", according to Chinese newspapers, for they are critical both of the "great leap" policy and the policy of all-out "communization" of villages and cities. It is these "new bourgeois elements", i.e., the best informed and intelligent people, who were the first to call attention to the colossal damage done to the Chinese economy by Mao Tse-tung's adventuristic precepts and utopian plans for China's entry "ahead of the set time" into the "golden age" of communism.

The Maoists' conception of "new bourgeois elements" has nothing in common with the Marxist teaching on classes. It does not explain but, on the contrary, obscures the essence of the social contradictions existing in Chinese society and the causes of the internal political struggle in China.

Liu Shao-chi was denounced as a typical representative and the chieftain of the "new bourgeois elements". The Maoists accused him of harbouring capitalist sympathies because he called for the development of productive forces and the raising of labour productivity through the use of material incentives. Liu Shao-chi pointed to the excesses that accompanied the organization of people's communes, criticized the abolition of the peasants' household plots of land as being premature, and said that the peasants should be allowed to own livestock and poultry. To the Maoists all this represented a "counter-revolutionary and revisionist line" the implementation of which would be a disaster to China.

For all that, incidentally, Liu Shao-chi's "revisionist" propositions found their way into the text of the new Constitution. Under Article 7 of this document commune members are allowed "to have in personal possession small plots of land and to carry on small-scale auxiliary farming and in the cattle-breeding regions to own a small amount of livestock".* To prevent the for-

* 1st Session of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (documents) (in Russian), Peking, 1975, p. 14.

mation and growth of a "new bourgeoisie", Mao Tse tung teaches, it is necessary constantly to think about the "class struggle" and to wage it ceaselessly.

Speaking at the 1st plenum of the 9th CPC CC, in 1969, Mao Tse-tung declared: "According to my observations, not in all, and not in the overwhelming majority of enterprises, but probably in a fairly large number of them hegemony is not in the hands of true Marxists, of the worker masses."

He thus expressed displeasure over the fact that not all the heads of enterprises abided by his instruction but guided by common sense and the interests of production continued to apply the piece-rate system, adhered to the principle of material stimulation, etc.

For some time in the period between the 9th and 10th CPC congresses the Chinese press, acting contrary to Mao's instructions, gave publicity to precisely those enterprises where the importance of technology was recognized, where specialists were respected and technical problems of production were solved, not through "class struggle", but by normal means, and where labour productivity and the quality of output were the main criteria for determining the size of wages. But such a state of things tended to undermine the authority of Maoist demagogues; it showed that to carry out Mao Tse-tung's ideas meant to impede the growth of production and strengthen the positions of the opponents of Maoism.

At the fourth session of the National People's Congress (1975) the Maoists again sounded the alarm: "Some enterprises are socialist property formally, but in reality management there is not in the hands of Marxists and broad masses of workers. Many positions, if they are not occupied by the proletariat, are taken over by the bourgeoisie." The Maoists see the spectre of capitalism at every step, although capitalist ownership was actually abolished in China long ago and there are practically no conditions for a revival of the capitalist system in the country.

The artificial exacerbation of contradictions and conflicts between different social groups, the division of society into "clean" and "unclean" sections, the calls for vigilance, the search for "class enemies," the constant scaremongering about the threat of restoration of the bourgeois state, the war psychosis whipped up by official propaganda are all designed to justify and legalize the crude and violent methods with which Mao Tse-tung and his retinue are trying to consolidate their rule. The Maoist conception of "aggravation of the class struggle in conditions of proletarian dictatorship" is intended to give a theoretical basis to the coercive methods used by Maoists to suppress their opponents, to put out the smallest sparks of discontent in society, to prop up the Maoist regime.

In reality, Maoism is not being threatened by the bourgeoisie which is politically weak and essentially helpless.

The Maoists also exaggerate the danger of private capitalist tendencies in the countryside. Of course, the peasants resent the constant interference in their affairs by zealous officials who are presumably carrying on a struggle against "private-proprietary instincts"; of course they are dissatisfied with the limited possibilities they have to engage in auxiliary trades, to use their household plots as they see fit and to rear livestock and poultry. In trying to deprive the rural working people of the possibility of augmenting their incomes, to "cut off the tail of capitalism", the local authorities act against the economic interests of the peasants, whose incomes from work in the people's communes are often insufficient even to feed their families. When a peasant takes up an auxiliary trade he does so, of course, not in order

to become rich, but simply in order to provide for himself and his family. In addition, the Chinese village is still under the sway of old traditions, customs, prejudices, superstitions and the clan system, which have survived despite the ideological and political campaigns, the "cultural revolution" included, that have been conducted since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. There is nothing accidental in this. In attempting to refashion the social outlook of the peasantry it is necessary to take into consideration the tenacity of age-old traditions. Such refashioning has nothing in common with the Maoist vigorous campaign against "capitalist tendencies".

Maoism has failed to establish its complete domination in China, not because of the "resistance of the bourgeoisie", but because of the opposition—open and concealed—to Maoist policies and precepts in the Party itself, in the army, among the workers and peasants. The Maoist line meets with resistance from that active, politically conscious part of Chinese society whom the experience of the "great leap", the people's communes and the "cultural revolution" has convinced of the infeasibility of Mao Tse-tung's designs and schemes. Nor do they believe in the possibility of a revival of "national grandeur" on the basis proposed by Mao Tse-tung. The latter's frantic efforts to thrust his formulas on the Communist Party and the entire Chinese society as the only correct ones, which are not to be discussed, let alone challenged, fail to arouse universal enthusiasm and jubilation. In the Party, in its leadership, in Chinese society a struggle is going on between different opinions, views and ideas concerning the character of socialist society and ways of building it, methods of industrialization of the country and

modernization of agriculture. Such debates cannot be avoided.

The emergence of different opinions and the clash of different views are natural in a country standing on the road of transition to socialism.

Understandably, it is more difficult to carry out a socialist revolution and lay the foundations of a socialist society in a country where the internal material prerequisites for this are not yet ripe and where precapitalist relations still exist in economic life, than in economically developed countries. Mao Tse-tung disagrees with this. He says: "The more backward the economy is, the easier, and not more difficult, it is to go over from capitalism to socialism. The poorer the people, the greater their striving for revolution."

In this thesis lies the source of all his erroneous, pernicious precepts, and the cause of his striving to solve all problems at one go. The horse-man only has to put spurs to his nag, and he will jump over all precipices and barriers—such is Mao Tse-tung's conviction. And if the objective conditions for this do not exist, this can be compensated for with a subjective effort, by an act of will. Hence the essentially spurious but rousing mottoes: "We will make everything out of nothing", "Man is stronger than Heaven"; hence the constant recollection of the legendary old man Yu-kun, who made up his mind to raze two high mountains that stood in his way and was rewarded by Heaven for his persistence. The matter is put this way: "It is necessary to have the desire, to display will, to strain forces, and a great goal will be achieved."

It is not accidental that the Maoists keep talking about a permanent revolution in politics and in the ideological sphere, about turning the whole

country into a school where everyone studies "Mao Tse-tung's ideas". According to Mao Tse-tung, the setbacks and failures in the carrying out of his Napoleonic designs are due to insufficient will and activity on the part of the executors, to an incorrect understanding of his instructions. In general, the importance of the subjective factor of ideas is grossly exaggerated in Maoist theories.

Undeniably, conscious activity, initiative and will are indispensable to the attainment of a set goal, to the accomplishment of the tasks of changing an outdated and unjust system of social relations. But they can lead to the desired result only when they are in accord with reality. If the material prerequisites are lacking, if the set tasks are infeasible and a wrong path has been charted, no will, no activity will lead to the desired goal.

Developments in China in recent years confirm the reactionary and utopian character of Mao Tse-tung's voluntaristic schemes. There have been periods in the history of the PRC when Mao Tse-tung succeeded in casting a spell over the CPC leaders and rank-and-file members, who were led to believe that Mao's plans and schemes were realistic and feasible. Dazzled by Mao's promises of imminent eternal happiness the advent of which, they thought, had been calculated by him with mathematical precision, spell-bound by the vision of the tens of millions of tons of steel and hundreds of millions of tons of grain that were to appear if they did as they were bidden, many Chinese Communists went about rallying the people, made steel in pots and pans, ploughed the land to a depth of one metre, dug reservoirs and erected dikes, singing praises of the "red sun". But soon a bad hang-over set in. And many of Mao

Tse-tung's followers became opponents of his ideas. It was not the "pernicious influence of bourgeois ideology" and not a desire to restore capitalism in China, but bitter experience, the failure of the policy of the "great leap" and people's communes, that made them turn away from Mao Tse-tung and reject his adventuristic precepts. What is called "class struggle" in China is not struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but a clash of two trends, Maoist and anti-Maoist, within the Communist Party of China.

Here it is interesting to note that after the 9th CPC Congress Party committees were restored in the provinces, a part of the cadre personnel who had been subjected to persecution during the "cultural revolution" were rehabilitated, an attempt was made to weaken the role of the military in government, the country's economic policy was revised, and so on. The reassessment during that period of the slogans and instructions issued by Mao Tse-tung and his close associates which was aimed at stabilizing the political situation in the country and promoting industrial and agricultural production, was regarded by different sections of Chinese society as signifying a return to the order that had existed before the "cultural revolution", as the restoration of the line of Liu Shao-chi which had been denounced as "bourgeois" and "counter-revolutionary". Even the Maoist press was compelled to report that in the provinces no difference was seen between the "red line" of Chairman Mao and the "black line" of the "scoundrel" Liu Shao-chi.

Lin Piao's downfall brought no clarification with regard to questions concerning the methods of administering the political affairs and the economy of the country. The charges made against the "scoundrel of the type of Liu Shao-chi", i.e., Lin Piao, were of a contradictory character. Words such as "erroneous" and "criminal" were used to describe Lin Piao's utterances which often were a mere paraphrasing of pronouncements by Mao Tse-tung. For instance, Lin Piao's dictum "politics must permeate everything" was condemned, while Mao's saying that "politics is the command force" was reaffirmed.

firmed as correct. The criticism of the line imputed to Lin Piao in the sphere of personnel policy, in the economic field (with the restoration of technical norms and rules and labour discipline, the enhancement of the role of specialists in industry and agriculture, criticism of the military for incompetence), and on questions of the attitude towards scientific personnel and the organization of colleges and schools, has aroused the discontent of many former active participants in the "cultural revolution", and led many to question the soundness of that campaign and the wisdom and infallibility of the "supreme directives of the great helmsman".

The reappraisal of the slogans of the "cultural revolution" period was marked by inconsistency. The duplicity of the Chinese leadership, the absence of a principled line of conduct impeded the process of stabilization.

Owing to the contradictory nature of the new policy, discontent was observed both among those who had been active in the "cultural revolution" and its victims who had been rehabilitated and restored to Party and administrative posts.

The struggle between two tendencies, two methods of leadership continued after the 10th Party Congress. Life itself has shown that Mao Tse-tung's slogans and precepts cannot serve as a basis for effective organization of the work of the Party and of economic and administrative bodies, for solving the complex problems of the country's economic development. But the Chinese leadership cannot bring itself to renounce these slogans and precepts openly. The development of Chinese society over a period of many years in conditions of the cult of personality of Mao Tse-tung had led to the elaboration of specific forms of political struggle marked by intrigues, hypocrisy, mutual distrust and suspicion, backstage fighting, and unprincipled short-term alliances. The Chinese press constantly complains that all sorts of evil-doers "are fighting the red flag under the red flag", which means that Mao's opponents fight

against Mao Tse-tung's directives using his own utterances.

In such conditions the Peking rulers constantly have to manoeuvre, to extol today that which they condemned yesterday. This is well illustrated by the twists and turns in the vituperative campaign against the "scoundrel of the Liu Shao-chi type". At first Liu was castigated for leftist actions. Then his line was described as "outwardly left but in essence, in content, right". At present it is said to be "extreme right".

The change of labels shows that the Chinese leadership is obliged to reckon with the sentiments of the middle and lower links of the new Party apparatus, with the discontent of the young people sent to the countryside. It was no accident that on the eve of the 10th CPC Congress *Jenmin jih-pao* carried many articles praising the activities of the hungweipings and stressing their importance. The Chinese press noted that the hungweipings had all opportunities for making their way up and turning themselves, mostly peasants, into party cadres.

The ferment among the exiled hungweipings grew when the reopening of the higher schools and an increase in their enrolment revived in these young people a desire to return to the cities and take up their studies again. But in the process of "proletarian hardening" in the countryside the now older hungweipings had forgotten what they had learned, while the restoration of the system of entrance examinations erected insurmountable barriers in the way of many former students. This is one of the many examples showing how the contradictory and double-dealing policy of the Chinese leaders aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country gave rise to new social contradic-

tions and conflicts. Without solving old problems, the search for compromise methods of easing tension within Chinese society created new ones.

The "cultural revolution" has slowed down considerably the political, economic and cultural progress of Chinese society, but the Maoists will not openly admit this.

It is typical of the Maoists to try to find the causes of their setbacks, not in their disregard for objective factors, not in their own blunders, but in the intrigues of the "enemies". The latter allegedly misunderstood and then deliberately distorted Mao Tse-tung's "correct" line and thus prevented its implementation. It is appropriate to recall here the following passage written by the great Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin: "...In Poshekhonye they used to reason that work is not a wolf and will not make off to the woods, and that the main thing is to settle personal accounts and tear each other's guts out. That will be real 'work'. As they went to the graveyard, local grandfathers would say that no matter what the trouble was the first thing one should do is to spot the 'evil spirit'. One would surely feel better then. The trouble would vanish as if by magic, and after that all possible boon would come to one." *

Such tactics, which call for concealing facts instead of facing them, is not only immoral. By failing to examine the causes of one's difficulties and failures, one is unable to overcome them and is likely to make the same mistakes in future.

The search for reliable ways of modernizing Chinese society, for effective methods of eliminating China's age-old backwardness and building

* M. Saltykov-Shchedrin, *Works* (in Russian), Vol. 15, p. 559.

up the national economy continues. The realization that the gap between the economic levels of China and the industrially developed countries is widening instead of diminishing spurs on the Chinese leadership, stupefied with Mao Tse-tung's ideas, to step up their activity.

The 10th CPC Congress practically did nothing to change the situation. Although experience had clearly shown the untenability of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" and his political and socio-economic views, the congress was held under the banner of Maoism.

True, the Mao cult is given less prominence in the documents of the congress. For instance, in the new CPC Rules his significance is not over-emphasized and his name is not repeated so often as in the Rules adopted by the 9th Congress. But nevertheless the decisions of the 10th Congress are influenced by Maoism to no lesser extent than the documents of the previous congress.

Let us take, first, the main report, which was delivered by Chou En-lai.* It reaffirms at the outset the correctness of the Maoist theory on the continuation of the revolution in the period when proletarian rule has been established. Set forth by Lin Piao in his report to the 9th Party Congress, this theory was now again acclaimed—this time as an outstanding contribution by Mao Tse-tung to the development of Marxism-Leninism.

The 10th Congress again condemned the theory, imputed to Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta, that "the main internal contradiction in the country is that between the advanced socialist

* Chou En-lai (1898-1976) since the 1920s' an active participant in the civil war in China, a prominent CPC leader; for many years was a Vice-Chairman of the CPC CC and Premier of the State Council of the PRC.

system and the backward social productive forces". It should be noted that this "absurd revisionist theory", as the Maoists put it now, was confirmed not only in the resolution of the 8th CPC Congress (1956), but in the speech of Mao Tse-tung himself at the 2nd plenum of the 8th CPC CC in November 1956. Here is what Mao Tse-tung said then: "...The class contradictions in China have already been resolved in the main today; the main contradiction within the country is now the contradiction between the advanced social system and the backward productive forces."

The influence of the Maoist new conception can also be seen in the fact that at the 10th Congress the task of raising production was rejected as erroneous. On this question the contradictoriness of Maoist views is particularly noticeable. Liu Shao-chi and later Lin Piao had been accused of putting too much emphasis on the task of furthering the development of production and disregarding the class struggle. But while rejecting the thesis that "development of production must be the main task after the 9th Congress", the 10th Congress at the same time called for "stimulating the development of production" and "paying due attention to questions of economic policy".

Maoism manifested itself at the 10th Congress also in the call "to pay more attention to the class struggle in the superstructural sphere". As we can see, the Maoist understanding of classes and class struggle is completely at variance with the Marxist teaching and is founded on a vulgar definition of classes and class struggle. What the Chinese press says on the class struggle is often simply ridiculous. For instance, *Kuangming jih-pao* noted on May 11, 1969: "Deaf-muteness is not an incurable ailment, but the struggle of two

classes and two lines." On questions of class struggle Mao Tse-tung and his followers reach the extremes of vulgarization of Marxism. To them, everything is "class struggle": family quarrels, arguments over concrete technical points, squabbles and intrigues in the set of Mao Tse-tung and his "loyal comrades-in-arms".

To justify and explain frequent reshuffles in the Party and state apparatus the necessity of class struggle in a proletarian state is invoked. In reading the documents of the 10th Congress one gets the impression that what Mao Tse-tung is concerned about is not stabilization of the situation in the country but the maintenance of tension in society. At the 10th Congress the sinister promise was made once again that the "cultural revolutions" would be continued in the future to preserve the purity of Chinese society and protect it against "revisionist contagion". The special emphasis on the importance of the "cultural revolution" was clearly designed to win the favour of the ex-hungweipings disappointed with the outcome of their "revolutionary uprising".

Typical of Maoism is the ambiguity, the vagueness of its propositions. The 10th Congress failed to clarify the issues which had been debated in the period between the two congresses. Evidently it was no slip of the tongue on Chou En-lai's part when he repeated Mao Tse-tung's words to the effect that the road to the bright future would be a tortuous one. So far the Chinese leaders do not see any straight road.

At the 10th Congress, just as at the previous one, there were loud calls for further cohesion to win still greater victories. But, as the course of events after the 9th Congress has shown, Maoism is incapable either of rallying the Party and people

or ensuring steady progress in the economic and cultural fields. The prevalence of the Maoist line at the 10th Congress is no guarantee that this line will be consistently carried out. It should also be borne in mind that directives issued in Peking are understood and interpreted in one way in Shenyang and in another way in Shanghai. One could not but agree with Chou En-lai when he said, "the collapse of the Lin Piao's anti-Party group does not signify the end of the struggle between two lines within the Party", and with Wang Hung-wen who said that this struggle was a complex one and would continue for a long time.

The outcome of this struggle, however, will not be in the Maoists' favour. The development of events after the 9th CPC Congress, at which Maoism proclaimed its victory over real and imaginary enemies, has demonstrated the untenability of the views held by the Maoists, their inability to find effective solutions to the economic, social and political problems confronting the country.

The Maoists have won a formal victory. They have destroyed the Party and state apparatus and subjected to persecution a vast number of Party functionaries and executive personnel, resorting to violence and employing the hungweipings and the army for this purpose. But the contradictions that existed before the "cultural revolution" were not removed. Nor was a solution found to the problem of carrying out more quickly the necessary socio-economic changes. The victors' camp became split, and the country was once again swept by a political campaign, this time against Lin Piao. Later Confucius, the ancient Chinese philosopher, was made a victim of the campaign. In the course of the campaign the Maoists again

seek to destroy their ideological opponents, whom they, as usual, accuse of adherence to revisionism and bourgeois ideology. They predict a long drawn-out struggle which "will flare up again ten, twenty, thirty times". Such is the grim outlook for the future which the CPC leaders pictured before the Chinese people at the 10th Party Congress. The waging of the "cultural revolution" was declared to be an objective law of the country's development.

Despite the fact that the "persons who have seized power and are taking the capitalist road" have been exposed and removed from power, and that the "second bourgeois headquarters" represented by Lin Piao and his supporters has ceased to exist, the Maoists are working overtime to preserve and heighten tension in the country. Defying logic and facts, they continue to regard Chinese society as consisting of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In its January 1975 issue the magazine *Hungchi* contends, for instance, that the main contradiction in Chinese society is the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which manifests itself primarily in the superstructural sphere; the danger of restoration of capitalism still hangs over the country, and therefore all talk of the class struggle coming to an end is harmful and seditious.

At the session of the National People's Congress, convened in January 1975 after an interval of many years, there was again heard the demand not to slacken efforts in the campaign of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius and in the struggle against "revisionism", and the call to fight the class enemies, to prepare for war, was again issued.

The New Constitution adopted at the session is to make "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" into state law, to increase their influence on the socio-political, economic and cultural life in China.

Compared with the old Constitution, the new one lays greater stress on the guiding role of the Party. This is evidently due to a noticeable weakening of the Party's authority as a result of the "cultural revolution". Today, when there is a need to strengthen the shattered system of political and administrative power, to enhance the position of the CPC as the ruling party, Peking has to overcome the resistance of diverse forces and in the first place of a part of the army command. The policy of restoration of the Party's prestige is regarded by local cadres as an attempt to establish a "feudal dictatorship", to restore the unchallenged domination of the supporters of Mao Tse-tung.

Shortly before the session of the National People's Congress opened the Chinese press repeatedly called for observance of the principle of democratic centralism, with emphasis not so much on democracy as on centralism. In any event, Mao Tse-tung is loath to give up his right "to command the rifle", not trusting even his closest associates. The Constitution assigns the post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces to the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

Article 11 of the new Constitution says that it is the duty of state institutions to combat bureaucracy. Yet the struggle against bureaucracy has been waged since the first days of the establishment of the PRC, but this evil, far from disappearing, continues to thrive. The "cultural revolution" was called a powerful movement di-

rected against bureaucracy. But this evil remained. Evidently the source of bureaucracy is not where Mao Tse-tung says it is. The root of the evil is in his "ideas", in his inability to find a correct, realistic approach to the solution of the complex problems of the country's social, economic and cultural development.

Bureaucracy had long existed in China, but at present it is sustained and grows as a result of the Mao cult, as a result of gross violation of elementary civil rights and of the democratic principles of conducting Party and state affairs.

The Constitution speaks of the need for free expression of opinions and discussions and points to the *ta tsu pao** as a new form of carrying out the socialist revolution. But it is well known that this new form was used by Mao Tse-tung, not in order to promote socialism, but in order to suppress the opposition, which tried, even if cautiously, to act in a democratic way. Mao succeeded in crushing this opposition only because he did not stop at violating the principles of democracy.

The new Constitution contains a statement to the effect that "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" are to serve as the basis for defining the ideology of the state. In this respect those who drafted the Constitution broke not fresh ground. Yuan Shih-kai** tried to establish Confucianism as China's official religion. After the Kuomintang

* Literally "large-character newspaper", a wall poster carrying criticism and self-criticism of "shortcomings" and "mistakes" in people's activity in various fields.

** General Yuan Shih-kai, President of the Chinese Republic from 1912 to 1916, who entertained the idea of restoring the monarchy and proclaiming himself the emperor of China.

came to power, the country's Constitution included an article saying that the principles of Sun Yat-sen were the only ideology of the Chinese state.

Today "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" have promulgated as the state ideology of China. But the Chinese people have such difficulty in assimilating these ideas that no one knows how many new "revolutions" and campaigns will have to be conducted before they become the dominant ideology of Chinese society. Attempts to implant them in the Chinese people have continued for over a quarter of a century, while those who oppose the ideas are vilified, defamed and denounced as revisionists and counter-revolutionaries, but Mao's ideas do not take firm root.

Many of Mao Tse-tung's slogans and utterances have been included in the new Constitution, and in this sense it can be called Maoist. But it is impossible on the basis of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" to achieve genuine cohesion of the Party or the country's unity. The adoption of the new Constitution will not remedy the situation. For everything that is put down in it is of a formal character, and this is openly admitted by all the contending groupings.

The adoption of a new constitution was welcomed by those forces who evidently hoped to stabilize the socio-political situation in the country by overcoming the internal political crisis resulting from Mao Tse-tung's adventurist policies. Commenting on the results of the January session of the National People's Congress, some foreign observers expressed the view that at long last a period of stabilization had set in after a period of stormy upheavals in China. But, as

subsequent developments showed, this opinion was premature.

The pernicious effects of the "cultural revolution" have not been fully eliminated. The timid attempts at stabilization have been cut short. The campaign of criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius has not helped to resolve the socio-political crisis which shook China in the latter half of the 1960's and the consequences of which are still being felt. The struggle of opposing trends in Chinese society, in the Party and army apparatus on questions of socio-economic and foreign policy continues. The fact that it has not so far assumed the extreme forms characteristic of the "cultural revolution" period does not mean that it is not an intense struggle. What this struggle is about is not always clear, for the contending groupings equally claim for themselves the role of adherents and defenders of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas".

The adoption of the new Constitution could have a stabilizing effect on the country if the Party and military leaders of present-day China had been educated in a spirit of respect for law. But if Mao Tse-tung himself has never considered himself bound by any laws, by the Party Rules and the Constitution, why should the local warlords and Party bosses allow their power and arbitrary rule to be restricted by any legal documents? The new Constitution introduces nothing new into the complicated relations between Peking and the local authorities. Thus, there can be no question of the beginning of a period of stabilization.

Neither the plenum of the CPC Central Committee held in January 1975, nor the session of

the National People's Congress raised, let alone solved, a single major socio-economic or political problem.

The new Constitution imposes no limits on Mao Tse-tung's arbitrary rule. It does not facilitate the struggle against the Maoist bureaucracy, or encourage democratic practice in the country. The state of tension in Chinese society is preserved. China's path to progress remains tortuous and difficult. This is evidenced by a new "theoretical" offensive launched by Mao Tse-tung in February 1975 when he issued the directive "to master the theory of proletarian dictatorship."^{*} A *Jenmin jihpao* editorial chided "some comrades" for still having "silly notions about the dictatorship of the proletariat and even mistaking for socialist some things of a capitalist character".

By launching a new campaign, ostensibly to promote the study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship but actually to further "Mao Tse-tung's ideas", the Maoists are trying to revive and revitalize the slogans of the time of the "great leap" and the "cultural revolution." The campaign of denunciation of Lin Piao and Confucius had not produced the desired results. People must have grown tired of the monotonous vilification of Lin Piao and Confucius. The campaign began to slack off, with people getting accustomed to it as to the irritating buzzing of a fly which they cannot get rid of.

While they were forced to condemn Lin Piao and Confucius, administrators used the very same methods of work which had but recently been

^{*} *Jenmin jihpao*, February 9, 1975.

denounced as "revisionist" and "bourgeois". Naturally, the forces within the Communist Party of China which strove for a normalization of the situation, for the development of the national economy, did not guide themselves by Mao Tse-tung formulas.

During the period of "adjustment", when the CPC was grappling with the after-effects of the "great leap", some Chinese leaders urged the use of material stimuli to raise labour productivity. Liu Shao-chi said in 1960: "If profit-and-loss accounting and remuneration in accordance with labour are carried out, if this is done fairly and sensibly, then everybody will be satisfied, and this will stimulate development of the productive forces." According to a hungweiping leaflet, Teng Hsiao-ping* said in 1961 that production could be raised "not through ideological work, but by means of material incentives". In the Chinese newspapers of that time one could read statements like this: "Only the piece-rate system can reflect comparatively fully the quality and quantity of work, and successfully carry out the principle of distribution according to work".**

A similar process of return to the principles of material stimulation was to be observed after the "cultural revolution". The more attention was paid to the questions of advancing and improving production and raising labour productivity

* Teng Hsiao-ping (born 1904), a prominent CPC leader, was declared during the "cultural revolution" to be "the second person in power taking the capitalist road". At present he is a Vice-Chairman of the CPC CC and a Deputy Premier of the State Council of the PRC.

** *Takungpao*, November 2, 1962.

in industry and agriculture, the more vividly the harmfulness of the Maoist precepts was revealed, the weaker the Maoists' positions in the Party and the state became. In such conditions Mao Tse-tung and his supporters mounted a new attack against their opponents, choosing for this purpose the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and, as in 1958, the question of survivals of "bourgeois law".

Some leading Party workers, the Maoists charged, "who are not clear about theory, regard capitalist things as socialist and take revisionist slogans for Marxist".* *Jenmin jihpao* said on June 29, 1975: "The principle of distribution 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work' was a negation of the age-old exploitative system with its rule 'he who works does not have, and he who has does not work'. If labour is taken as the criterion for distribution, all working people are equal. But the practical application of this criterion to different working people leads to actual inequality. It is this inequality that is bourgeois law. In so far as we admit that its existence is inevitable, we must also see its evils, which have to be reduced to a minimum."

The paper accused Lin Piao of having tried to extend the sphere of action of "bourgeois law", of insisting that the principle of distribution according to work and of material incentives is the motive force of the development of socialist production. *Jenmin jihpao* criticized those Party workers who, not understanding the theory of proletarian dictatorship, having no correct know-

* *Jenmin jihpao*, March 21, 1975.

ledge of "bourgeois law", and influenced by revisionism, became attracted to the idea of "material stimulation" and "distribution according to work as the command force", and as a result they went astray and damped the enthusiasm of the masses. In implementing the principle of distribution according to work, the newspaper continued, it was necessary not to lose sight of the principle that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the command force" and, as production developed, gradually to reduce the differences in payment.

It is clear from the newspaper article that, like many peasants, the Maoists do not regard managerial, administrative work as labour. To them labour is only work in the field, physical work. In their opinion, "he who does not appear in the field for three days has no right to vote". If an administrative worker (*kanpu*) does not work like everybody else in the field, he is bound to "degenerate."

"In socialist society," *Jenmin jihpao* continued, "bourgeois law not only continues to occupy the dominant position in the sphere of distribution, but is much in evidence in the sphere of human relations too."

As in 1958, the Maoists have launched, in the guise of a new campaign to deepen the study of theory, an onslaught on the social rights and economic interests of the workers and peasants. Holding out to Chinese society the bogey of restoration of capitalism, they demand that the practice of payment according to work, the piece-rate-bonus system and material stimulation be restricted.

Although the material and intellectual condi-

tions for eliminating the distinctions between town and country, workers and peasants, mental and physical labour are not yet ripe in China, the Maoists demand that a struggle be launched for reducing these distinctions.

Yao Wen-yuan, a member of the CPC CC Politburo, and Mao Tse-tung's loyal mouthpiece, declared: "If this is not done, and if, on the contrary, a consolidation, extension and strict observance of bourgeois law is demanded, there is bound to take place polarization. That is, during distribution a minority will appropriate increasing amounts of goods and money through certain legal and many illegal channels. Bourgeois ideas of gain and pursuit of personal fame and benefit, born on such 'material stimulation', will become widespread, and such phenomena as plunder of public property, speculation, corruption, vice, thievery and bribery will appear. Capitalist principles of commodity exchange will penetrate political and even inner-Party life. The socialist planned economy will collapse, and there will be capitalist exploitation—the conversion of commodities and money into capital and of labour power into a commodity. In those institutions and organizations that are following a revisionist line the character of property will change, and the working people will once again be oppressed and exploited."*

We have cited this long passage to show the kind of methods—those of deception, intimidation and blackmail—used by the Maoists in their attempt to impose their views on the country. The untenability of their schemes was clearly demon-

* *Jenmin jihpao*, March 1, 1975.

strated by the unsuccessful experiments in the years of the "great leap" and the "cultural revolution". In those years, too, the Maoists tried to intimidate the Chinese working people with the imaginary danger of capitalist degeneration, of the restoration of bourgeois and landlord power. Now we are witnessing their third attempt to build their reactionary utopia. The lessons of the past have been lost on them.

To be sure this time the means used by the Maoists in waging their campaign are not so outrageous as during the "cultural revolution". No hungweipings are asked to help, and the apparatus of state and Party power is not being demolished. What the Maoists try to do is to put psychological pressure on the Party functionaries and administrative personnel and ideological pressure on the masses of working people and thus secure their voluntary agreement to reduce their material requirements to the barest minimum. In other words, the workers and peasants must tighten their belts still more so that the Maoists could spend more on building up the military-industrial potential.

In the course of the new campaign the Chinese press says that growth of the ideological and political level of the workers and peasants, the mastering by them of the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" must become the decisive factor in raising the labour productivity. According to it, "production immediately dropped" in those factories and plants where material stimulation was given preference over class struggle. *Jenmin jihpao* pointed out on May 15, 1975 that "not the chase after material stimulation, but an understanding of the depravity of this stimulation should serve

as an evidence of the production activity of the masses".

The Maoists have also intensified their attacks on those peasants who continue to engage in auxiliary trades and grow crops which bring them profit and not those which they are bidden to grow from above.* Despite exhortations and threats, the peasants persist in their effort to increase their incomes, "worshipping", as *Hungchi* complains, "the god of wealth and enthusiastically engaging in capitalist activity".**

Judging by material published in *Jenmin jih-pao* and *Hungchi*, the new campaign is meeting with both passive and active resistance among Party functionaries and among the masses of workers and peasants. The peasants, for instance, refuse to understand how, after collectivization and "communization", exploiter classes can arise in the countryside***. During political study sessions peasants say that after the establishment of communes they have all become one family, that exploitation in the countryside has long ceased to exist, and there is no need to carry on class struggle.

The leaders of agricultural brigades prefer to concentrate on their job and regard the instructions on intensifying ideological-education work and the class struggle as a "soft directive", i.e., one that can be ignored. Industrial managers continue to speak out against the abolition of material stimulation; they believe that observance of the principle of payment according to work and the provision of material incentives to the

* *Hungchi*, No. 5, 1975, p. 15.

** *Ibid.*, p. 17.

*** *Jenmin jih-pao*, April 10, 1975.

workers remain the motive force of the development of production.* They say that the existence of certain inequality is inevitable, and necessary under socialism, and that it would be premature to try to abolish it, just as it is impossible to do away with commodity production and commodity-money relations.

It is evidently because they have to reckon with such sentiments that the Maoists do not venture to carry out their slogans about restricting "bourgeois law" and confine themselves to theoretical discussions of the "law" and calls to condemn it. While fighting against the "bourgeois wind", Maoist propaganda is at the same time obliged to warn against being carried away with the "wind of communism", pointing out that attempts to abolish forthwith the law of value, to give up commodity production, commodity-money relations and the principle of distribution according to work would do harm to the economy of the country.

The contradictory and ambiguous character of the new Maoist precepts gives rise to new confusion within the Communist Party of China. The struggle between the supporters and opponents of these precepts takes on the form of arguments in which the Maoists insist that at present it is necessary to "restrict bourgeois law", while their opponents cite the words of Mao Tse-tung himself to the effect that at present "it is possible to only restrict bourgeois law".

The new campaign for the study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship has brought no clarity to the difficult problem concerning the ways of development of Chinese society and methods of

* *Jenmin jihpao*, April 24, 1975.

promoting economic growth. It has demonstrated once again Maoists' theoretical impotence and practical helplessness in solving the formidable problems facing China, namely overcoming its economic, scientific, technical and cultural lag in comparison with the advanced countries of the world.

Judging from the outcome of past campaigns it is fair to assume that the present campaign will be equally ineffective, for life itself has demonstrated that it is impossible to solve China's complex problems and to eliminate quickly the widening gap between it and the developed countries with the help of Maoist slogans and directives. Maoism does not dare analyze the objective causes of the failure of its policy line. Instead, it talks about imaginary causes, distorting and falsifying facts. Self-criticism is a thing unknown to Mao Tse-tung. In his attempt to mend matters, to find a way out of the impasse he directs his anger against those who departed from his slogans. Even though they did not act openly and vigorously against Mao Tse-tung, they became his worst enemies, for the untenability of his precepts is seen all the more clearly against the background of the positive results of their actions.

The essence and the direction of the social and economic processes taking place in China cannot be understood with the help of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas". It is impossible to foresee, even in general outline, the tendencies of social development in China. Mao's political precepts constantly come into conflict with the real socio-economic possibilities, interests and requirements of the development of society.

But the perniciousness of Maoism, the harm it does to China, is not limited to this. Maoism

hinders a solution of the problems facing Chinese society. The Mao cult, which is assuming ever greater proportions, rules out any possibility of a free, democratic discussion of questions of internal and foreign policy.

Maoism has a detrimental effect on the style of work. The generation of Chinese, educated in the spirit of Maoism, is characterized by hypocrisy, unthinking repetition of strident slogans, and general apathy. Maoism cripples people morally, depriving them of the ability to stand firmly on positions which they consider to be correct. In conditions of the Mao cult people are afraid to have their own convictions, and if they have them they do not dare express them. The victims of the Mao cult become puppets who move only when the strings are pulled. They are easily made to confess sins and crimes they have never committed.

It is indicative that the most orthodox Maoists promoted to posts in the Party and state apparatus are quickly infected by the very same diseases they were out to cure: bureaucracy, conceit, self-complacency, indifference towards the needs of the masses, striving for higher ranks and greater privileges. Many of them, seeing that it is impossible to combine useful activity with adherence to the Maoist precepts, prefer to do nothing. Participation in physical work, and learning by heart quotations from Mao cannot stop this degeneration which results from objective social conditions. The economic roots of bureaucratic practices, Lenin said, lie in "the atomised and scattered state of the small producer with his poverty, illiteracy, lack of culture, the absence of roads and *exchange* between agricul-

ture and industry, the absence of connection and interaction between them." *

Maoism gives rise to an atmosphere of stagnation in society by suppressing all that is creative and constructive in it. Until the Chinese Communists shake off the oppressive burden of the Mao cult the outlook for Chinese society will remain grim.

Maoism does harm to Chinese society in yet another way. In an atmosphere poisoned by Maoism it is hard to breathe, let alone speak. The voice of upright people is not heard. Demagogues and careerists advance to the foreground. Falsehood, hypocrisy, unscrupulousness, repudiation of one's own ideas and convictions become standards of behaviour for many people. Mao Tse-tung needs "non-rusting cogs", and the machine of official propaganda turns them out. People distrust one another; they do not say what they really think, fearing lest their views should contradict the directives of the day. As noted earlier, as a result of frequent changes of directives the "world outlook" of most people is reduced to a set of slogans. People get accustomed to praising one thing one day and an entirely different thing the next.

Of course, the social and psychological wounds inflicted by Maoism will eventually heal, but that will be a long and difficult process.

* V. I. Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 32, p. 351.

III. Maoism Against Peace and the Security of Nations

In the first years following the formation of the People's Republic of China Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders called for friendship and co-operation with all the socialist states. They supported the actions of these states in the international arena aimed at safeguarding and strengthening peace and the security of the peoples, and supported the principle of peaceful co-existence in relations with the capitalist countries. The Chinese government was actively opposed to colonialism and all forms of national oppression. Together with the other peoples, the Chinese people fought against the danger of a nuclear war, against the aggressive policy of the imperialist powers. This foreign-policy line accorded with the vital interests of the Chinese people.

At the end of the 1950's, having embarked upon the path of adventurism in internal policy, the Chinese leadership drastically changed its policy also in the international arena. Mao Tse-tung began to repudiate more and more openly the struggle for peace and a relaxation of international tension. Peking voiced, ever more loudly, discontent with and vexation at Moscow's peaceable moves.

The struggle of the Soviet people for the consistent implementation of the principles of peace-

ful co-existence, their vigorous efforts to secure general disarmament and a ban on nuclear tests were winning increasing support from people throughout the world. All the nations hailed the Soviet Union's peace programme. But the Chinese leaders headed by Mao Tse-tung came out against the efforts of the socialist and other states to achieve world peace.

Acting contrary to the common interests of all the nations, the Chinese people included, the Maoists started a propaganda campaign in which hypocritical protestations of a striving for peace went hand in hand with sabre rattling. The Peking press gave wide publicity to Mao Tse-tung's words that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger", and that in the event of a war "at most one half of mankind will perish, and another half will survive, but imperialism will have been wiped off the face of the earth and the whole world will become socialist". *

A striving to maintain international tension, to exacerbate and expand conflicts between states, to thwart efforts aimed at strengthening peace and security is typical of the Maoists' present foreign policy. The arguments change and Chinese diplomacy has become more flexible, but Peking's foreign-policy aims remain the same. As in the late 1950's, the Maoists today are actively opposed to détente. They bitterly attack the Peace Programme advanced by the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, heaping abuse and slander upon the steps taken by the Soviet government to carry out this programme.

* These words appear in a statement issued by the PRC government on September 1, 1963.

Thanks to the persistent efforts of many states the process of détente has deepened. The "cold war warriors" find themselves in increasing isolation. In the 1970's important changes have taken place in the relations between the world's two largest states, the USSR and the USA, which have helped to improve the world political climate. Every day brings fresh proof that the forces of peace, democracy and social progress are the first to gain from détente. It is in the vital interest of mankind that this improvement in Soviet-American relations in the recent years should become irreversible.

Sober-minded people are aware that if these two great powers firmly adhere to a course of peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflicts, it will become possible to secure a lasting peace on earth.

To be sure, the improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA does not remove all the contradictions of our time. There remain many problems which will give rise to new contradictions and conflicts. The policy of détente is aimed at resolving conflict situations, at creating such international conditions in which relatively insignificant local conflicts could not grow into major ones involving more and more states.

The policy of détente teaches nations and statesmen to prefer peaceful means of settling conflicts, to accept the fact that a thermonuclear war will benefit no one, and that no "beautiful civilization" can be built on the ruins caused by war.

The ideas of peace and international co-operation are winning millions of supporters the world over. The new international atmosphere reduces the possibilities for action by the reactionary for-

ces which are trying to stem the movement of the peoples toward democracy and social progress.

These conservative forces, which thrive only in the poisonous "cold war" atmosphere, find allies in the Peking leaders, who, adhering to the Maoist thesis—"the worse, the better"—denounce the Soviet peaceable policy and try to fan the cinders of the "cold war".

Declaring hypocritically that they too are in favour of international détente, the Maoists are at the same time at pains to convince the Chinese people and people in other countries that the struggle for peace and against war is a hopeless undertaking and therefore not worthy of serious attention. Yet they deny that they want to preserve international tension. Thus at their 10th Congress in August 1973 CPC leaders declared that China was not against détente in international relations.

On the other hand, coming out against the normalization and improvement of Soviet-American relations, distorting the character of the changes in contemporary international relations, they condemn the appeals issued by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to broaden the front of the struggle of the peoples for a lasting peace, calling them a "chimera" and a "smoke-screen" designed to deceive the peoples.

At the 10th Congress of the CPC, Chou En-lai maintained that the present world situation was characterized by "colossal upheavals" and that from the point of view of the interests of the people this is "not a bad thing but a good thing" since upheavals "cause confusion and divisions in the enemies' camp and awaken and harden

the people".* Thus at the congress the Maoist thesis that international détente benefits, not the masses, but imperialists, "revisionists" and reactionaries was again heard. This thesis was first advanced by Mao Tse-tung in 1959, and it is repeated today although the situation in the world has changed considerably since then.

The Chinese press would have its readers believe that the talk of establishing a lasting peace on the basis of democracy and humanism is well-nigh the main threat to peace and is in fact leading to war. "The road to a 'lasting peace' advocated by Soviet revisionism," *Jenmin jihpao* asserted on January 29, 1975, "is a road to war, a road to the perpetual enslavement of the oppressed nations and peoples of the world." The paper expressed concern lest any one should "fall for this bait of peace" and came out with the absurd and irresponsible statement that "there can be no tranquillity in the world, war is inevitable as long as imperialism and social-imperialism exist".

The Maoists' negative attitude towards détente manifested itself also at a session of the National People's Congress held in January 1975.

Although the new Constitution speaks in favour of peaceful co-existence and of struggle against the policy of aggression and war, on the whole it, like the other documents of the session, reflects a state of war psychosis. The session urged the Chinese peoples, the soldiers and commanders of the National Liberation Army to step up "preparation for the eventuality of war", "dig deep tunnels" and "stock up grain".

Intimidating the Chinese people, the Peking

* 10th Congress of the CPC (documents) (in Russian), Peking, 1973, pp. 23-24.

leadership asserts that the danger of war in the world is increasing and not diminishing. It has started propagating the traditional view of China's rulers that "the state falls apart unless threatened by external enemies". Peking presents a grim picture of the international situation. Ignoring the growing peace movement, Mao Tse-tung and his followers are preparing in advance funeral rites, if not for the whole of mankind, at least for a greater half of it—excluding, naturally, themselves. "The peoples of all countries," Peking keeps grinding, "must prepare for the eventuality of war."

By misrepresenting the tendencies of international development the Chinese leaders involuntarily betray their secret designs, their desire to heighten international tension.

Judging by the reports presented at the January session of the National People's Congress, the Chinese leadership is interested in a further exacerbation of contradictions in the world and in the first place those between the Soviet Union and the United States.

As is clear from Chou En-lai's report, it is the Chinese leaders' dream that an armed conflict should break out between these two great powers, which, they hope, will "sooner or later lead to a world war". According to Chou En-lai, "there is no détente, let alone any stable peace, in this world".*

Denying that positive changes have taken place in international relations in recent years, the Chinese leaders come forward as advocates of preservation of international tension, which, as fol-

* 1st Session of the 4th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (in Russian), Peking, 1975, pp. 60-61.

lows from their pronouncements, must lead to a world revolution, to be preceded or accompanied by a global bloodbath.

The Chinese leaders depict the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as well as that of the United States as "rapacious", spearheaded at "swallowing up" China as well as Europe and America, to say nothing of the Third World.

While deliberately misrepresenting the diplomatic activity of the Soviet Union, the Peking leaders declare that they have no intention of turning China into a "super-power" and have no hegemonic plans, and that they will content themselves with the modest function of rallying and leading all the countries of the world in a struggle against the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, they consider a compromise with the United States possible, but rule it out in the case of the Soviet Union. Imperialism thus turns out to be more suitable to Peking as a partner in the political game of nations, while the struggle against the "two super-powers" assumes, in practice, the form of vicious attacks against the Soviet Union.

Chinese diplomacy does everything in its power to undermine the international positions of the Soviet Union, frustrating its efforts to preserve peace and security of the peoples. The Maoists make no secret of their intention to hinder political stabilization in international relations, to exacerbate the contradictions between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Maoists are fighting actively against the stabilization of the situation in Europe, against its conversion into a continent of peace. They openly advocate the continued functioning of NATO and the consolidation of this politico-mili-

tary bloc of the imperialist countries as a counterweight to the socialist community.

In October 1971 the People's Republic of China was admitted into the United Nations Organization. This took place owing to the persistent efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states as well as a number of newly-free states over a period of many years to restore China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and to expel Chiang Kai-shek's representatives from the world organization. Regrettably, the very first moves of the Chinese diplomats at the UN showed that the ruling circles of China intend to use the rostrum of this international organization for the propaganda of the Maoist doctrine of "two super-powers", for attacks on the Soviet Union.

Chinese representatives at the UN oppose all actions aimed at easing international tension. They turned down the Soviet Union's proposal on convening a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament measures. They blocked the admission of the young Asian state of Bangladesh into the UN and tried to prevent, in October 1974, the adoption of the Soviet-American resolution on settling the Middle East conflict.

Chinese diplomats are also hard at work to undermine the foundations of peace and security in Asia. The Soviet proposal on establishing a collective security system on the Asian continent has been denounced by Peking as an attempt to encircle China, to form an anti-Chinese bloc in Asia.

The absurdity of this charge is self-evident, for the Soviet proposal envisages China's participation as a full-fledged member in the Asian collective security system. In rejecting this idea, the

Chinese leaders show a contemptuous attitude with regard to the interests of the Asian peoples, who want to live in good neighbourliness, peace and accord. Such striving for peace and stability in Asia runs counter to the ambitions of Peking, which dreams of becoming the ruler of the Asian peoples and to this end tries to incite discord and strife between Asian countries and within them.

Peking supports the separatist aspirations of certain political groups in Asian countries. It backs the reactionary elements opposing the progressive policies of the governments of India and Burma. Disregarding the interests of the peoples of Asia, the Chinese leaders express themselves in favour of preserving the United States' military presence in Asia.

To advance its great-power aims, to derive maximum benefit from contradictions existing between some Asian countries, the Maoist leadership sacrifices the interests of the liberation movement in Asia. The belief is widely held in Asia that Peking's foreign policy is often the chief cause of tension and instability and conflict situations in the world. The policy of disuniting the countries of Asia and also of Africa is conducted along with a policy of rallying these countries round Peking and placing them under Chinese influence.

To win over the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, Peking lavishes praise on them. The Third World is declared to be the main force of our times.

Such an evaluation of the role of the Third World countries in contemporary world politics serves first of all domestic-policy ends. Assuring the poorly informed Chinese public that its foreign policy is supported by many countries

and peoples and extolling its moves in the international arena, which in reality run counter to the vital interests of the Chinese people, the Peking government wants to enhance its prestige and authority at home.

Peking is turning out militant anti-imperialist slogans in an attempt to form, under its banners, a bloc of Asian and African states as a counterweight to the camps of socialism and capitalism. At the same time, it uses such slogans to wangle greater concessions from the imperialist forces, while saving its face as "the leader of the revolutionary forces".

At the 10th CPC Congress the Chinese leadership reaffirmed its intention to be the spokesman for the Third World countries, although there were loud protestations of China's unwillingness to "claim the role of hegemon". Such hypocritical words could not, however, conceal the Maoists' great-power ambitions. (It may not be amiss to recall here that in 1927, after Chiang Kai-shek's coup, Kuomintang propaganda also divided the political forces of the world into three groups: white imperialism, red imperialism, and the oppressed nations. These nations were to unite round China and to fight, under its leadership, against white and red imperialism.) In justification of its claims to hegemony in the Third World Peking asserts that China belongs to the Third World and that it is not only a socialist but also a "developing" country.

In this way the Chinese leaders present their great-power ambitions as conforming to the common interests of all the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. They have long since assumed the right to speak on behalf of the peoples of

these three continents, and of late they have intensified their efforts in this direction.

While inciting Third World countries to take actions against big imperialist powers, assuring them that "the weak always defeat the strong", and provoking armed struggles in certain countries, the Maoists not only take great care to avoid a direct confrontation between China and the imperialists, but try to normalize her relations with them. This can be seen in the drastic changes that have taken place in recent years in Peking's relations with Washington, Tokyo and Bonn.

In their negotiations with representatives of big imperialist powers the Chinese leaders have shown themselves to be past masters at devising unprincipled schemes, thus revealing their political cynicism, their readiness to reach the kind of compromises which they but yesterday branded as "traitorous".

To win footholds in Asian and African countries, the Maoists are doing their utmost to weaken the political, economic and cultural ties of these countries with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and to belittle Soviet assistance to the young states, although it is well known that friendly assistance from the socialist countries plays an important part in strengthening the positions of the progressive, democratic forces in these states in their struggle against reactionary and conservative elements.

Peking's line of undermining the relations of the Afro-Asian states with the socialist world objectively cannot but play into the hands of the pro-imperialist, reactionary groups in these states and hinder their socio-economic development. Peking makes it difficult for the Asian and Afri-

can countries to join in their struggle against the imperialist powers.

Some Third World politicians are liable to fall under the influence of the Maoists' propaganda. The Chinese leaders adroitly exploit the heightened national feelings of some Afro-Asian leaders and win their favour with flattery, praise and servility. But sweet words are followed by the demand to subordinate the national policy of the country concerned to the great-power interests of the Chinese leadership.

There is an ever-present element in the Peking leadership's relations with both the capitalist and developing countries. Whatever the subject under discussion, Chinese politicians invariably use the occasion for attacks against the Soviet Union. Anti-Sovietism pervades Peking's diplomatic activity. There has not been a single international congress or conference in recent years at which the delegates were not served an anti-Soviet dish cooked in the Maoist kitchen. At the CPC congresses held after the "cultural revolution" the Soviet Union was declared to be China's Enemy No.1. The blame for all the Maoists' failures and blunders in the economic field has been invariably laid at the Soviet Union's door.

Whereas under the 1954 Constitution friendship with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries was an integral part of the foreign-policy doctrine of the Chinese state, the new Constitution elaborates on struggle against what it calls social-imperialism—a label Peking propaganda uses to avoid direct mention of the Soviet Union.

The new Constitution and reports delivered at the last session of the National People's Congress contain slanderous assertions to the effect that China is threatened with aggression on the part

of the Soviet Union. Mao Tse-tung must have thought that it was not enough to have this malicious calumny repeated almost daily in the Chinese press and on the radio, and decided to have it written into the Constitution, thus turning a lie into law. The Chinese leaders are worried by the fact that there are still forces in the country and in the Party itself which are for normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, for restoration of friendship and co-operation between the two countries in the interests of both the Chinese and Soviet peoples. Evidently the existence of such sentiments led Chou En-lai to declare in his report that ideological disputes "should not interfere with the maintenance of normal state relations between China and the Soviet Union".

Such statements could only be welcomed if they were backed with corresponding deeds. Regrettably, Chou En-lai misrepresented at the session the aims and intentions of the Soviet government and distorted the essence and content of its proposals concerning normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. By so doing he made it clear that Peking refuses to discuss in good faith the Soviet proposals on settling the border questions. This attitude does not serve the interests of the Chinese people.

The Soviet policy aimed at normalizing relations with China is dictated by a desire on the part of the Soviet people to be good neighbours and to co-operate with the Chinese people. The Soviet government has repeatedly said that it has no territorial claims against China, at the same time rejecting China's claims, voiced by Mao Tse-tung, to large parts of Soviet territory. Moreover, the Soviet Union has proposed the con-

clusion of a treaty with China on non-aggression and non-use of armed force and all kinds of weapons—conventional or missile and nuclear ones, against each other. The Chinese leaders have turned down this proposal.

Behind the refusal by the Chinese leadership to normalize relations with the Soviet Union there lie internal political reasons. Peking uses anti-Sovietism to suppress the internal forces which are opposing Mao Tse-tung's socio-economic policies. Playing on nationalist sentiments, the Maoists accuse their opponents of betrayal of national interests, of currying favour with foreigners, of servility, etc.

The social aim served by anti-Sovietism is seen in the Maoists' ideological drives against their political adversaries in the Party and in the country at large. Discontented with the anti-popular policy of Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communists who are seriously concerned about the future of their country, about ways of eliminating its economic and cultural backwardness, see an alternative to Maoism in Marxism-Leninism, in the experience of the Soviet Union.

It is the growing activity of these forces, and not the imaginary "menace from the north", that the Maoists fear. The Maoists use anti-Sovietism as an ideological bludgeon against those who disagree with Mao's policy. In trying to provide a theoretical basis for their diplomatic activity, the Maoists use the geopolitical, nationalist approach instead of the class approach in analyzing international relations.

Marxist-Leninists regard the main contradiction of the present epoch as that between the forces of world socialism and the forces of world capitalism. In the process of the resolution of this

contradiction the whole of mankind will accomplish, under the leadership of the working class, the transition to socialism.

The Maoists refuse to recognize the incontrovertible fact that the social basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community differs fundamentally from the social nature of the foreign policy of the United States and its partners in politico-military blocs. The Maoist approach to the contradictions of our epoch obscures the class essence of the changes taking place in the world, hinders efforts to clarify complex international issues, and provides a justification for Mao Tse-tung's foreign-policy precepts, the purpose of which is to frighten the Chinese people with the imaginary scare of anti-Chinese encirclement, to heighten nationalistic sentiments and thereby to account for the need to accept new hardships and sacrifices.

In their assessments of the world situation the Maoists refuse to consider and analyze facts and events and actual changes in international relations, and try to get away with general empty phrases such as "states strive for independence, nations, for liberation, and peoples, for revolution".

In describing the international situation the Maoists avoid precise definitions and assessments so as not to be committed in the process of pursuing their foreign-policy aims. In this, as in the Maoists' evaluation of the domestic situation in China, one sees their characteristic "world outlook made up of slogans", the content of which changes depending on the requirements of the day.

Taken as a whole, the Maoists' activity in the

international arena prevents the rallying and consolidation of progressive forces and the broadening of the struggle for peace and the security of the peoples. The foreign-policy doctrine and practice of Maoism run counter to the Leninist principles of the foreign policy of socialist states.

IV. The Classes and Social Groups Whose Interests Maoism Expresses

On whom does Mao Tse-tung rely in the pursuit of his policy? Which are the classes or social groups whose interests are reflected in his "ideas"? The Maoists' answer is: The ideas of Mao Tse-tung are the ideology of the proletariat and they serve the interests of the working class and the peasant masses of China. Outside China the Maoism is widely regarded as a petty-bourgeois ideology while Mao Tse-tung himself is described as a typical representative of the petty-bourgeois strata of Chinese society. There are some who hold that Maoism is a bourgeois ideology or something close to it and that Mao Tse-tung expresses the interests of the national bourgeoisie of China. This view represents a misconception of Maoism and the national bourgeoisie of China for it completely ignores the anti-capitalist tenor of the Maoist views and is contradicted by facts.

Maoism as an ideology that is opposed to scientific communism took final shape after the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution had been accomplished and the political and some of the social conditions had been prepared for the gradual establishment of the economic basis of a socialist society. Chinese society consists of two principal classes, the working class and the pea-

santry. Landlords were abolished as a class in the course of the agrarian transformations in the early 1950's. Kulaks, an insignificant part of the rural population even before the people's revolution, ceased to exist as a social group after the establishment of co-operatives. In 1956 changes were carried out in a peaceful way in private capitalist industry and trade. Ownership of the means of production by the exploiter classes was eliminated once and for all.

The former exploiter classes, the national bourgeoisie included, have no political party of their own and no possibility of influencing the country's domestic and foreign policy. In the eyes of the people they have been discredited politically and morally, and the extent of their influence on public opinion has been reduced practically to naught, all the more so since their social activity is under the control of the state.

Peasants continue to form the overwhelming majority of the population. Since the revolution the position of the peasantry has changed appreciably. It has gone over from individual to collective forms of farming.

Since the revolution the number of factory and plant workers has increased considerably. Officially the working class is regarded as the leading class; it is united in trade unions, and the Communist Party is "the political party of the proletariat, the vanguard of the proletariat" (CPC Rules).

The Maoists declare that they solely express the genuine interests of the working class and the peasantry. But when studying this question one should remember Lenin's methodological instruction. Thus, Lenin, objecting to the full identi-

fication of the Russian autocracy with the ruling classes, wrote: "This is inaccurate, or wrong. The autocracy satisfies *certain* interests of the ruling classes, maintaining itself partly by the inertness of the mass of the peasantry and the small producers in general, partly by balancing between conflicting interests, and constituting, to a certain extent, an independent organized political force." * This approach stays true in analyzing the relationship between the ideology of Maoism and the interests of the working class and the peasantry of China.

Neither the peasantry nor the working class of China represents a homogeneous entity. The establishment of co-operatives and later the "communization" of agriculture did bring about considerable changes in the life of the peasantry, but they did not remove all the distinctions between the different groups of the rural population. The socialization of the land and the introduction of collective forms of farming have not yet turn the peasantry into a class of the socialist type. Chinese theoreticians themselves usually refer to the following categories of the rural population: poor peasants, lower middle peasants, well-to-do peasants, and vestiges of landlords and kulaks.

The working class of China is not homogeneous, either. It comprises a group of veteran, skilled workers, a group of young workers, a group of apprentices, and a group of persons termed "both workers and peasants".

Taken as a whole, the peasantry and the working class have been the greatest beneficiaries of the revolution. Their social and economic posi-

* V. I. Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 6, p. 164.

tion has indisputably improved compared to what it was under the Kuomintang. They are better fed and clothed. This is particularly true of the poor peasants and the lower categories of the working class. On the other hand, their living standard remains relatively low and their requirements are modest. As before, the countryside suffers from a shortage of schools and teachers and the lack of hospitals and doctors. It is evidently impossible to solve this problem everywhere in the near future. The state has neither sufficient means nor the personnel for this. In these conditions such half-measures as the training of "barefooted doctors" or the establishment of schools providing only a minimum of elementary knowledge satisfy at present only the poor peasants and the lower middle peasants. It is among them that Mao Tse-tung's slogan—"Turn to the village"—and his calls for levelling of incomes find a lively and positive response.

In formulating their policy the Maoists orient themselves primarily on the sentiments and demands of the poor peasants and those middle peasants, whose standard of living remains low. These strata make up the bulk of the rural population. Being for the most part unskilled, they are not interested in payment according to work but prefer distribution according to mouth as this would give them a guaranteed minimum of food. They have nothing to do with the market and fear novelties and drastic changes. Their chief concern is to feed their families.

Another part of the social base of the Maoists is the least skilled segment of the working class. The least literate and lowest paid, these workers do not realize the necessity of greater payment for skilled labour. Being for the most part young,

they remain captives of small-peasant psychology. Proletarian class consciousness is a thing unknown to them; nor can it be developed under the Maoist regime. These workers prefer to receive a certain minimum payment out of a fear that they would become the losers if the piece-rate system were introduced.

This part of Chinese society falls more easily under the influence of Maoist propaganda. Its world outlook is shaped under the impact of the slogans of the day and one-sided information.

It is among these social groups that the Maoists recruit their activists, demagogues who repeat phrases learned by heart and the real meaning of which they often do not understand. These activists make up the political base of Maoism. But it is an unreliable base which is being eroded in the course of the country's socio-economic development, and its role in Chinese society is bound to decrease steadily.

The positions of the Maoists among the worker-peasant masses cannot be regarded as firm and strong. Despite the brainwashing and the vast efforts to keep the people in spiritual bondage, the political consciousness of the workers and peasants does not stay at one and the same level. Life itself teaches them, they are "educated" by the anti-proletarian, anti-popular policy of Mao Tse-tung which is against their vital interests.

The Maoists themselves are constantly uneasy, expressing fear that the masses will break the stranglehold of their influence. The Chinese press keeps emphasizing the need to intensify and widen the campaign of political "education", warning that if the criticism of what they call revisionism

is discontinued even for one day capitalism will immediately raise its head.

The Chinese press often expresses the fear that the workers and peasants can easily and quickly become "corrupted". This shows that the Maoists do not trust the workers and peasants and are afraid to lessen even for a moment the ideological and psychological pressure on them.

It should also be borne in mind that there has formed in China a fairly large stratum of administrative-managerial cadres, whose fate depends on the political line of the top leadership of the Party and the state. This category of officials has its own interests which sometimes coincide and sometimes clash with the interests of the workers and peasants. Both supporters and opponents of the Maoist policy can be found among them.

The "cultural revolution" and other repressions which are let loose on these people from time to time serve the purpose of turning them into obedient executors of instructions from Peking. It is they who are accused, in the event of setbacks and failures of the Maoist policy, of bureaucratism, isolation from the masses, "revisionism", etc. And yet, being cogs in the Party-state apparatus, they are the necessary channel through which Peking obtains information about the state of things in the provinces, the feelings and moods of the people, the forms their discontent takes, etc. In pursuing their policy the Maoists rely on this social group, the composition of which they constantly try to regulate by adding "activists" to it. But as soon as the interests of this social group are infringed on, passive or active opposition to Maoism appears among its members.

It should be added that the part of the peasantry and the working class constituting the social

base of Maoism supports the Maoist policy in a passive and routine manner rather than actively and consciously, it is merely going with the stream and submitting to pressure from above. The same is true of a large part of the cadres. The political aims and socio-economic implications of the Maoist policy, its inconsistency and contradictoriness often remain outside their grasp. To this day many of them cannot understand the difference between the "black line" of Liu Shao-chi and the "red line" of Mao Tse-tung; nor can they comprehend the real causes of the sudden downfall of Lin Piao, who was made the political heir apparent to Mao Tse-tung in the CPC Rules adopted at the 9th Congress. It is with good reason that among the cadres and the people at large the notorious "struggle between two lines" is called "dogfight".

In the period of the "cultural revolution" the army played the decisive role in demolishing the Party-state apparatus and upholding and strengthening Mao Tse-tung's rule. It proved to be the force which, under the command of Lin Piao, saved Mao Tse-tung. The army came to control all areas of the political, economic and cultural life of the country. In China the army represents not only a military but also a socio-political organization. Its importance in Chinese society can hardly be overrated. The indoctrination of Maoism among the military personnel is much more intensive and better organized than at civilian institutions and organizations. And although these are different groupings within the army, it serves as a unifying force in the country. In it, as in the party and state apparatus, both staunch supporters and convinced opponents of Maoist ideas are to be found. But on the whole the army is

successfully used by the Maoists to maintain order and suppress opposition in the country.

The social base of Maoism being unstable, the army serves as an instrument of coercion in safeguarding the Maoist regime, performing the function of police surveillance. But Mao Tse-tung cannot fully and wholly rely on the army cadres, especially the top ones. This is shown by the Lin Piao affair, and by the frequent reshuffles among the top commanders of the People's Liberation Army. Hence Mao's striving to keep the reins of command of the army in his own hands.

The Maoists are evidently aware of the instability of their social base and they do not fully trust the army either. Thus, they try to keep together all the parts of the pedestal of the Mao cult with the hoop of nationalism.

In 1958, in learning about the results of a mass tree-planting campaign, Mao Tse-tung expressed his puzzlement over them the following way: "The more greenery we plant the less trees there are." It is the same with "Mao's ideas". The more intensely they are implanted, the less supporters and adherents they have. The whipping up of nationalistic sentiments is an integral part of Maoism. Playing on nationalistic views and sentiments, as they did during the "great leap" period, the Maoists hope to patch up the holes in their policy course.

The social base of Maoism will become increasingly weak as the country develops socially and politically, as the working class grows stronger and the socialist elements in Chinese society are consolidated. Relying on coercion and demagoguery and taking advantage of the low cultural and political level of the masses, Mao-

ism can win a new lease of life, possibly for a relatively long period, but historically it is doomed, it has no future in China. In the end the Chinese people will find their way out of the labyrinth into which they have been led by "Mao Tse-tung's ideas". The general laws governing mankind's socio-historical development will come into their own in that great country as well.

Л. Делюсин
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